Psychology as the study of mind was an established subject matter throughout the nineteenth century in Britain, Germany, France, and the United States.
within faculties or schools of philosophy. 'Philosophy' at this time had both broad and narrow senses. Broadly, it was roughly equivalent to the 'arts and sciences'; narrowly, it might be restricted to logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy (though the latter was becoming separate as 'natural science'). Psychology was variously positioned under these rubrics, sometimes in metaphysics (Lotze 1881 (Lotze [1886 ), sometimes as an autonomous division of philosophy (Mill 1846, p. 532 ), but most often as an empirical natural science (Beneke 1845, p. 5; Wundt 1863, 1:iv) . It was known under various titles, including 'moral science', 'mental science', 'theory of the mind', 'physiology of the mind', and _ S_ e_ e_ l_ e_ n_ l_ e_ h_ r_ e or theory of the soul. other.
The traditional associationist psychology was represented by Bain, by James Mill (annotated edition, 1869), and then by Sully (1884 Sully ( , 1892 . It treated psychology as a science of mental phenomena or of consciousness.
Indeed, J. S. Mill contended that unconscious mental states (as postulated by Hamilton) are a contradiction in terms (Mill 1865, chap. 15) . Associationists adopted the usual classification of mental phenomena under intellect, feeling, and will, but denied that it revealed underlying discrete mental faculties.
Their main explanatory strategy was to discern or posit elements of consciousness and then show how the laws of association, operating on such elements, can explain mental abilities and mental phenomena more generally.
The associative laws usually included a law of spatial or temporal contiguity and a law of similarity. Carpenter's _ P_ r_ i_ n_ c_ i_ p_ l_ e_ s _ o_ f _ M_ e_ n_ t_ a_ l _ P_ h_ y_ s_ i_ o_ l_ o_ g_ y (1874) emphasised the mutual interaction of mind and body. Following a chapter on the nervous system it was organized into psychological topics, including the usual coverage of the senses, attention, higher cognition, and motor action, together with medical topics such as intoxication and delirium. Carpenter, who adopted a comparative perspective, recognized psychologically relevant instincts in animals, but argued that in humans there are no instincts beyond those involved in basic maintenance, such as the beating of the heart. He explained all other apparently instinctual behavior in humans associationistically, as 'automatic' behavior acquired through experience (1881, j f191 Ewald Hering (see Hatfield 1990, chaps. 4-5) .
In the period 1850-75 Lotze was the foremost German academic philosopher and psychologist (Brentano, Stumpf, and G. E. M" uller were among his students).
He analyzed spatial perception in his _ M_ e_ d_ i_ c_ i_ n_ i_ s_ c_ h_ e _ P_ s_ y_ c_ h_ o_ l_ o_ g_ i_ e, _ o_ d_ e_ r, _ P_ h_ y_ s_ i_ o_ l_ o_ g_ i_ e _ d_ e_ r _ S_ e_ e_ l_ e (1852), where he introduced the doctrine of 'local signs'. He contended that the merely physical spatial order of the retinal receptors and optic nerve could not itself explain the spatial order of perception. Rather, the sensation from each nerve fiber must receive a qualitative marker peculiar to that fiber, from which the spatial order of retinal stimulation might be reconstructed through a psychological process, whether innate (Lotze's early view, 1852, pp. 330-7, 354-60) or learned (Helmholtz's view, 1867 (Helmholtz's view, [1924 , and later Lotze's, 1881 Lotze's, [1886 ). The problem of deriving spatially-ordered perceptions from discrete nerve fibers was long discussed (James 1890, 2:157).
In 1834 the physiologist Weber published what became known as Weber's
Law. This law concerned the _ j_ u_ s_ t _ n_ o_ t_ i_ c_ e_ a_ b_ l_ e _ d_ i_ f_ f_ e_ r_ e_ n_ c_ e_ s between intensities of a stimulus, that is, the amount by which a stimulus dimension, such as weight, had to be increased in order to produce a noticeable difference.
Weber found that within limits this amount varies as a constant fraction of the stimulus value, at least for pressure on the skin, weights lifted by hand, line lengths perceived by sight, and the pitches of tones. The physicist Gustav Fechner developed Weber's result into a fundamental law of psychophysics (1860 [1966] ). Fechner argued that the relation between physical stimuli needed to produce a noticeably different sensation yields an indirect measurement of the sensation itself. His argument explicitly assumed that the just noticeable difference is a constant unit of sensation, that is, that the differences between each pair of just noticeably different sensations are equal; and it treated the threshold of sensation--that is, the smallest perceivable value, e.g., the smallest pressure that can be felt on the skin--as defining the zero point for the scale of sensations, and the unit value for the physical stimulus. Using these assumptions he produced his famous psychophysical law, according to which sensation varies as the log of the stimulus value times a constant (which means that felt intensity goes up arithmetically while the stimulus intensity increases geometrically Wundt increasingly emphasised the variety of influences on apperception.
To understand the apperceptive process in an adult human in the nineteenth century, Wundt believed, one would have to consider her cultural context, which would have to be approached through the historical development of the belief system of the culture in question, together with the personal development of the individual. He thus came to think that the processes of higher cognition could best be approached through _ V" _ o_ l_ k_ e_ r_ p_ s_ y_ c_ h_ o_ l_ o_ g_ i_ e, or ethnographic psychology, which he regarded on par with the physiological or experimental branch (1887, 1:5-6), or as likely to replace it (1908, p. viii) .
In one of the few attempts actually to distill 'objective' materials for psychology from history and culture, Wundt (1900-20) sought to reveal the developmental laws of human thought through the history of language, myth, and morals. Many German experimental psychologists rejected Wundt's claim that higher mental processes could not be subjected to experiment, and many regarded psychology as properly a natural science (see Kusch 1999, chap. 1-2).
Wundt (1894) James' two-volume _ P_ r_ i_ n_ c_ i_ p_ l_ e_ s _ o_ f _ P_ s_ y_ c_ h_ o_ l_ o_ g_ y put a phenomenalist and functionalist stamp on theoretical psychology in America. It synthesized and appraised the main theory and findings concerning sensation and perception, cognition, and will. James defined psychology as 'the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions' (1890, 1:1), the latter including nervous processes, behavioral consequences, and environmental conditions. With a hint of irony, he labeled both 'spiritualist' and 'associationist' theories as metaphysical, because each attempts 'to _ e_ x_ p_ l_ a_ i_ n our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities', among which he included not only 'Soul', but also 'Ideas' or 'Elementary Units of Consciousness' (James 1890 1:vi). He was not opposed to explanation in general, but he rejected appeals to mind-stuff or to atomistic sensations (as posited by Hume, Mill, Helmholtz, and Wundt) to explain conscious experience.
James' own explanations appealed to physiology, acquired habit, and the function of mind in adjusting the organism to its environment. He considered the main methods of psychology to be introspection, experiment, and the 'comparative method' applied to children and across cultures, to 'madmen, idiots, the deaf and blind, criminals, and eccentrics', and to the history of science, politics, and culture (1:194). James reported the new experimental findings from Germany but was not much impressed by them, proclaiming that in many cases great effort had 'as yet borne little theoretic fruit', while admitting that more work would be done and allowing that it might well yield theory (1:193).
The Englishman Edward Bradford Titchener, who studied philosophy at
Oxford, psychology at Leipzig, and then went to Cornell University in 1892, was a leading presence in American experimental psychology. Titchener (1908, 1909a&b ) adopted Wundt's elementalism and the Leipzig laboratory's interest in chronometry. But he deviated from Wundt in treating attention not as an independent mental activity but as a property of sensation (1908, lec. 6) , and in accepting physiological processes as explanatory in psychology (1909b, pp. 38-41) . In pursuing the Wundtian project of resolving mental life into into its elements, he adopted the method of analytic introspection. Other American psychologists, including John Dewey (1896) and James Rowland Angell (1907) , focused on the function of mental processes, over the search for elements.
Titchener (1898) as its subject matter, or perhaps regarding 'mind' as a natural activity of the organism (without necessarily endorsing materialism). The new psychology was, in Lange's oft-repeated phrase, a 'psychology without a soul ' (1866 [1925, 3:168] ).
With talk of a unitary mental substance banned, new formulations of psychology's subject matter had to be developed. We have seen that Spencer and Mercier took one branch of psychology to focus on explaining behavior.
But most authors made mental phenomena the sole subject matter of psychology, and saw behavior merely as an expression of mind. These authors variously described psychology's subject matter as 'phenomena of mind' (Sully 1884, pp.
1-2), 'phenomena of consciousness' (Baldwin 1889, p. 8), or 'immediate experience' (Wundt 1901 (Wundt [1902 . This subject matter was to be studied with both 'subjective' and 'objective' methods, including direct reports of experience, behavioral manifestations, and physiological conditions.
Supposing that the object of description and explanation in psychology is conscious experience, there was further division over the type of entities or states to be admitted into psychological explanations. Some insisted that only conscious mental states be admitted. Others posited unconscious mental states that produce conscious mental states, while still others posited physiological states (not directly correlated with consciousness) as causes or explanatory conditions. Some considered such physiological states to be psychological, others not. Lewes was a dual-aspect monist (1877, prob. III, chap. 3) who held that organic processes can be at once physiological and psychological (1880, p.
149). Those organismic states having a mental aspect need not be conscious.
A state is mental because it enters into the organism's overall mental functioning, not because it is accessible to consciousness. Around the turn of the century many psychologists endorsed the notion that physiological states could be psychological without being accompanied by consciousness (M" uller and Pilzecker 1900, pp. 78-82, 271; Titchener 1909b, pp. 38-41, 369 ).
The functionalist Angell defended regular appeal to physiological processes in psychology on the grounds that psychological activity is a form of biological adjustment; he decried the usual parallelism as 'insipid, pale, and passionless ' (1907, p. 81) and invoked an instrumentalist attitude toward the mind-body distinction itself, suggesting that mind be seen as an activity of organisms.
Of all the theoretical and methodological issues attending the new psychology, the place of introspection is most notorious. Despite widespread acknowledgment of 'objective' methods, the main experimental and observational methods of the new psychology relied on introspection, loosely defined.
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